Truth in Lending: The Impossible Dream by Drain, John M.
Case Western Reserve Law Review
Volume 22 | Issue 1
1970
Truth in Lending: The Impossible Dream
John M. Drain Jr.
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Law Review by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University School of
Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
John M. Drain Jr., Truth in Lending: The Impossible Dream, 22 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 89 (1970)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev/vol22/iss1/9
19701
NOTE
Truth in Lending: The Impossible Dream
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE RIGHT OF A CONSUMER to defer payment for a debt or for
the purchase of property or services is at least as much a part
of the American way of life as apple pie and Saturday afternoon
football.' Everybody buys on credit, and, what is more, no one is
ashamed to admit it.2 Buying on credit has been cited as a principal
cause of the rapid acceleration of economic growth in the United
1 See D. BELL, THE END OF IDEOLOGY 246 (1960). See also BOARD OF GOVER-
NORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, CONSUMER INSTALLMENT CRtEDIT ptS. I-IV
(1957) [hereinafter cited as CONSUMER CREDIT STUDY], a massive study of the insti-
tution of consumer credit, especially Part I, Growth and Import.
The availability of credit to anyone who meets the minimum qualifications may
serve to reinforce American democracy:
Credit, if used properly, serves as an important democratizing force. Stated in
its simplest terms, people with modest incomes usually do not have the cash
with which to purchase furniture, TV sets, refrigerators, cars, and washing
machines. Time buying does afford low- and middle-income couples greater
opportunity to marry earlier, raise families while they are young, and to enjoy
many of the benefits that others take for granted. Hearings on S. 1740 Before
the Subcomm. op Production and Stabilization of the Senate Comm. on Bank-
ing and Currency, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 75 (1961) [hereinafter cited as 1961
Hearings on S. 1740] (statement of Hillel Black, author of BUY Now, PAY
LATER (1961)).
2 In the past the use of credit was considered a taint of the lower classes. See Hear-
ings on S. 5 Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions of the Senate Comm. on
Banking and Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 38, 56 (1967) [hereinafter cited as
Hearings on S. 53. The advent of the automobile, however, encouraged installment
buying, and today the "buy now, pay later" philosophy has been adopted in every eco-
nomic stratum of our society. See generally J. GALBRAITH, THE AFFLUENT SOCIETY
(1960). Outstanding consumer credit increased from $64 billion in 1962 to $117
billion in August 1969, and rose at a rate of over $1 billion a month in the latter half
of 1968. This growth of installment debt has been horizontal - an increase in the
number of debtors - rather than vertical - an increase in the volume of debt among
prior debtors. Shapiro, Installment Credit, in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 354,357 (1968).
Professor Galbraith attributes much of the change in consumer credit attitudes to
advertising: "The relation of emulation [due to advertising] to indebtedness is even
more direct. . . People have changed their view of debt. Thus there has been an
inexplicable but very real retreat from the Puritan canon that required an individual
to save first and enjoy later... . J. GALBRAITH, supra at 159. This change in attitude
is reflected in the present use of credit from the cradle to the grave.
[Many [Americans] are virtually living on time. Babies are born on the
installment plan, people go on African safaries and hunt polar bear and if
they outsmart the bear have him stuffed, all through the flick of a credit card.
Even funerals are being paid for on what the English quaintly call the never-
never. 1961 Hearings on S. 1740, supra note 1, at 75 (statement of Hillel
Black).
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States since World War 11. 3  In addition, the American consumer
is able to make the most of his leisure time because he can buy goods
today and pay for them tomorrow. Most consumers would agree
that buying on credit is a worthwhile convenience which is here to
stay. Creditors feel the same way because most consumers are faith-
ful about making their payments. 4
Yet, despite the general post-World War II prosperity,5 there
was a growing awareness among consumers that all was not so
well. Many consumers were unable to shop for the best credit terms.
Consumers were not adequately informed when they bought on
credit, and they were often exploited by overreaching merchants.'
In an effort to provide the uninformed consumer with some pro-
tection from being gouged by excessive interest rates, Congress re-
cently enacted the Truth in Lending ActC as Title I of the Consumer
Credit Protection Act.8 Truth in Lending applies to both kinds of
3 11 CONG. REc. 16,425 (1965) (remarks of Senator Douglas).
Expressed in 1958 dollars, the gross national product doubled from 1950 to 1968,
rising from $355 billion to $707 billion. BUiAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES Table No. 457, at 312 (1969). Per capita personal
income rose from $1,800 in 1950 to $2,900 in 1968. Id. Table No. 459, at 313. The
entire economy has experienced constant growth since 1946. Id. Table No. 460.
For a brief history of consumer credit extension in this country, see Shapiro, supra
note 2. See also Hearings on S. 2755 Before the Subcomm. on Production and Stabili-
zation of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 23-24,
353-55, 537-39 (1960) (Consumer Credit Labelling Bill) [hereinafter cited as Hear-
ings on S. 2755]; Note, Consumer Credit - Proposed Truth-in-Lending Legislation,
16 DEPAUL L. REv. 464, 465 (1967).
4 That creditors are making money from their credit operations is demonstrated by
the tremendous growth of credit extension since World War II. See note 2 supra.
There is evidence that some merchants make as much profit from the credit aspect
of their sales as from the mark up on the product itself. 1961 Hearings on S. 1740,
supra note 1, at 75-76. In 1960, Spiegel's, Inc., one of the country's largest mail-order
houses, made $39.7 million from its credit charges, which accounted for 55 percent of
its gross income. Id. at 220-21. Nevertheless, creditors repeat the lament that credit
operations cost them money. See Hearings on S. 750 Before the Subcomm. on Produc-
tion and Stabilization of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 88th Cong., 1st
Sess., pt. 2, at 1493-542 (1963) [hereinafter cited as 1963 Hearings on S. 750]; Hear-
ings on S. 1740 Before the Subcomm. on Production and Stabilization of the Senate
Comm. on Banking and Currency, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1962) [hereinafter cited
as 1962 Hearings on S. 1740]. See also N.Y. Times, Nov. 5, 1963, at 39, col. 2.
5 See note 3 supra.
6 One of the examples of excess credit charges presented to a subcommittee conduct-
ing hearings on Truth in Lending was the case of an electrical worker who owed $182
on a $123.88 television set after paying $175 in 11 months. N.Y. Times, Aug. 17, 1963,
at 25, col. 5.
7 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-13, 1631-41, 1661-65 (Supp. IV, 1969).8 Pub. L. No. 90-321, tits. I-V, 82 Star. 144 (1968) (codified in scattered sections
of 15, 18 U.S.C.). The Act was passed on May 29, 1968. Truth in Lending went into
effect on July 1, 1969. See Andrews, Truth in Lending Law Takes Effect Today As
Consumers Cheer But Lenders Grumble, Wall Street J., July 1, 1969, at 9, cols. 1-2
(Midwest ed.). Title II of the Consumer Credit Protection Act regulates extortionate
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consumer credit - consumer credit purchases and consumer loans.
The basic requirements of the Act and the regulations thereunder'
(Federal Reserve Regulation Z) are that certain items be disclosed
to the buyer or borrower before the credit transaction is completed,
including the total amount of the finance charge and the finance
charge stated as an annual percentage rate of the unpaid balance.10
The finance charge is the sum of all direct and indirect charges im-
posed by the creditor incident to the extension of credit, including
interest or time-price differential, service or carrying charges, loan
fees, credit investigation fees, and insurance premiums if coverage
is required before credit will be extended. 1 The annual percentage
rate is that rate which will yield an amount equal to the finance
credit transactions; Title III restricts garnishments; Title IV establishes a National Com-
mission on Consumer Finance; and Title V contains miscellaneous guidelines for judi-
cial interpretation of the Act.
The Consumer Credit Protection Act was first introduced by Senator Douglas of
Illinois in 1960 as the Consumer Credit Labelling Bill. See generally, Hearings on S.
2755, supra note 3. After its initial rejection in 1960, Senator Douglas reintroduced
it the following year [See generally 1961 Hearings on S. 1740, supra note 1], but it
was again short-lived. See N.Y. Times, Sept. 7, 1962, at 15, col. 1. The bill was revived
in 1963 [see Hearings on S. 750 Before the Subcomm. on Production and Stabilization
of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1 (1964)
[hereinafter cited as 1964 Hearings on S. 750]; 1963 Hearings on S. 750, supra note
4], and was introduced a fourth time in 1965 as S. 2275 [see 111 CONG. REC. 16,428(1965) (remarks of Senator Douglas)], but never got out of committee. Senator Doug-
las labeled this defeat a "victory for the usurers and money lenders." Wall Street J.,
June 24, 1964, at 2, col. 3. In its final form, the bill passed the Senate under the aegis
of Senator Proxmire on July 11, 1967, by a vote of 92-0. Wall Street J., July 12, 1967,
at 3, col. 2 (Midwest ed.). See generally Hearings on S. 5., supra note 2; 113 CoNG.
REC. 2042 (1967) (remarks of Senator Proxmire).
It was not until the Truth in Lending Bill reached the House of Representatives
in 1967, after being delayed in the Senate for 7 years, that the broader consumer protec-
tion package was conceived. The bill's leading supporter in the House was Representa-
tive Leonor Sullivan, who introduced the provisions restricting garnishment (Title III)
and establishing a National Commission on Consumer Finance (Title IV). The follow-
ing Truth in Lending (Tide I) proposals by Representative Sullivan failed to receive
approval: required disclosure of total finance charges on first mortgage loans to home
buyers [see note 44 infra]; a statutory ceiling of 18 percent on annual interest rates;
authorization for the Federal Reserve Board to exercise credit controls during a national
emergency; and authorization for the Federal Reserve Board to regulate downpayments
for credit purchases or contracts for future delivery of commodities traded on commod-
ity exchanges. See Wall Street J., July 21, 1967, at 3, col. 2 (Midwest ed.); id., Oct. 5,
1967, at 9, col. I (Midwest ed.). But two important parts of the Truth in Lending title
were added in the House: (1) the advertising provisions [see text accompanying notes
69-72 infra], and (2) the requirement that the cost of credit life insurance be figured as
a part of the total finance charge if the customer is required to buy such insurance.
Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1605(b) (Supp. IV, 1969); see Fed. Res. Reg. Z,
12 C.F.R. 226.4(a)(5) (1970).
9 Fed. Res. Reg. Z, 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.1-.12 (1970).
10 15 U.S.C. §§ 1631, 1637-39 (Supp. IV, 1969); see Fed. Res. Reg. Z, 12 C.F.R. §
226.1(a)(2) (1970).
11 15 U.S.C. § 1605 (Supp. IV, 1969); see Fed. Res. Reg. Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.4(a)
(1970).
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charge when applied to the unpaid balances of the amount being
financed. 12
The premise behind Truth in Lending is that disclosure of fi-
nance charges as an annual percentage rate will accomplish two
things: (1) it will enable the consumer to more easily identify and
compare credit terms and thus make better use of his credit dollar,
and (2) it will enhance economic stability because consumer credit
will be more responsive to variations in general monetary policy.'
This Note attempts to demonstrate that Truth in Lending does
not deserve all the praise it has been receiving. 4 Held out by poli-
ticians as a comprehensive program of consumer protection, it gives
the consumer only mild protection at best because it employs the
vehicle of disclosure rather than regulation. 5 Truth in Lending
will only help those who are both able and willing to shop for
credit.' In addition, Truth in Lending will fail to enhance eco-
nomic stability because the average consumer is insensitive to the
interest rates he pays.' 7  The discussion will begin with an examina-
tion of consumer confusion over credit charges, followed by a review
of the legislative responses of the states, a description of Truth in
Lending's major provisions, and an evaluation of the Act.
II. TRUTH IN LENDING: A NECESSARY ITEM
Truth in Lending grew out of the existing consumer confusion
12 15 U.S.C. § 1606 (Supp. IV, 1969); see Fed. Res. Reg. Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.5
(1970).
The annual rate may be rounded off to the nearest one-quarter of 1 percent (15 U.S.C.
§ 1606(c) (Supp. IV, 1969) ), and until July 1, 1971, creditors have the option of dis-
dosing finance charges in dollars per hundred instead of an annual percentage. Id.
§ 1606(f).
13 See 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (Supp. IV, 1969).
14 See Hodges & Flint, Full Disclosure of Credit Charges, 23 FED. B.J. 170 (1963);
Jordan & Warren, Disclosure of Finance Charges: A Rationale, 64 MIcH. L. REV. 1285
(1966); McEwen, Economic Issues in State Regulation of Consumer Credit, 8 B.C. IND.
& COM. L. REV. 387, 396 (1967); Zeisel & Boschan, The Simple Truth-in-Lending,
116 U. PA. L. REv. 799 (1968); Note, Consumer Credit - Proposed Truth-in-Lending
Legislation, supra note 3; Comment, The Consumer in the Market Place - A Survey of
the Law of Informed Buying, 38 NoTRE DAME LAW. 555 (1963); 18 VAND. L REV.
856 (1965).
But the comments have not been altogether favorable. See Johnson, Regulation of
Finance Charges on Consumer Installment Credit, 66 MicH. L. REv. 81 (1967);
Kripke, Consumer Credit Regulation: A Creditor-Oriented Viewpoint, 68 COLUM. L.
REV. 81 (1968); Note, Truth in Lending? - A Viable Subject, 32 GEo. WASH. L REV.
861, 888-91 (1964).
15 See notes 110-26 infra & accompanying text.
16 See text accompanying notes 110-12 infra.
17 See notes 104-07 infra & accompanying text.
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over credit costs."' Before Truth in Lending, tle "6 percent myth"
prevailed. This was the belief, held by most consumers, that honest
creditors would never charge more than 6 percent interest.19 In
addition, creditors were waging a battle of euphemisms in the com-
petition for the consumer's credit dollar. They would give different
names to their credit charges in an effort to minimize the one charge
that everyone knew about, the interest rate.20 The following situa-
tion is typical of the existing consumer confusion:
[C]onsider the case of a man who wants to buy an automobile
which has a cash price of $2500. He may be told by the dealer that
he can finance the purchase at a rate of six dollars per hundred per
year on a thirty-month contract through a sales finance company.
A bank might offer to lend him the purchase price at six per cent
per year, discounted, with a maturity period of twenty-four months.
He might also obtain a loan from a small loan company whose
rates are 2 per cent per month on the first $200, two per cent
per month on the next $300, and 5/6 of one per cent on the re-
maining balance, over thirty-six months. A credit union to which
the buyer belongs lends money at one per cent per month and pays
an annual patronage dividend of uncertain amount. In addition,
the buyer may have a savings account at a bank on which he re-
18 Hearings on S. 2755, supra note 3, at 239, 241-45; see CONSUMER CREDIT
STUDY, supra note 1, pt. I, at 191.
19 See Hearings on S. 2755, supra note 3, at 309,322,465-66,605.
20 Truth in Lending uses the single term "finance charge" to represent all the credit
costs incident to a transaction. 15 U.S.C. § 1605 (Supp. IV, 1969); see text accompany-
ing note 11 supra.
Thus, "finance charge" is broader than the conventional term "interest." A banker
defines interese
Interest is, of course, a charge that is made for the use of money. In determin-
ing the charge that is to be made on any loan, we must first figure the basic
value of money. Two other matters must then be considered, and one of
those would be the element of risk involved, and the other the amount of
work required to process and keep records over the term of the loan. 1961
Hearings on S. 1740, supra note 1, at 218.
"Pure interest" involves only the first of these three elements, since it is merely payment
for forbearance on a riskless investment R. JOHNSON, STUDIES IN CONSUMER CREDIT
NUMBER 2, METHODS OF STATING CONSUMER FINANCE CHARGES 57 (1961). Finance
charges include all of these elements:
Finance charges can be divided into two elements: (1) a charge for the use of
money, which can be termed the interest charge (this includes both the econ-
omist's concept of "pure interest" and the compensation for the risk of not be-
ing paid), and (2) service charges for administrative costs with respect to the
credit, such as the costs of processing the credit and investigating the risk. If
the amount of credit extended is very large, the proportion of the credit charge
applicable to service charges will be small and the proportion applicable to
interest charges will be large. The converse will be true where the amount
of credit extended is small. Jordan & Warren, supra note 14, at 1297.
See also 1961 Hearings on S. 1740, supra note 1, at 592, 596, 609, 628.
Professor Johnson argues, however, that the terms finance charge and interest rate
represent two different concepts, and thus the former should not include the latter. R.
JOHNSON, supra at 57.
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ceives four per cent per year interest. It is virtually impossible for
the average buyer to determine which of the competing credit sup-
pliers is offering him the cheapest credit.21
It was obvious that only through legislation would the consumer's
confusion be cleared up.
Further support for remedial legislation came from economic
circles. It was felt that excessive consumer credit might contribute
to economic instability or even recession, and that complete credit
disclosure would combat this by causing a decline in the volume
of consumer debt:22
III. BACKGROUND OF CONSUMER
CREDIT LEGISLATION
Until the early 20th century, the principal credit legislation in
this country consisted of state usury laws.2 3 These statutes set limits
on the amount of interest that can be charged for the use of money.
The limits vary from state to state, the most common being a rate
of 6 percent a year. The usury statutes generally contain a proviso
that the statutory limit will not apply if the interest rate is specified
in the loan contract. Most states, however, have a maximum rate
21 Jordan & Warren, supra note 14, at 1293. See also Hearings on S. 2755, supra
note 3, at 586-90.
2 2 See 1961 Hearings on S. 1740, supra note 1, at 373. See also J. GALBRAITH,
supra note 2, at 163.
The effect of the expansion of consumer credit is to add an uncertainty, parallel-
ing that which business borrowing brings to business spending, to the hitherto
more reliable consumer spending. The instability may be greater, for the
terms of consumer credit will be eased - down payments reduced and repay-
ment periods lengthened - as an aspect of competitive merchandising tech-
niques. Id.
There is little danger, however, of an increase in consumer debt contributing to
economic instability as long as the quality of that debt is good. The percentage of
disposable income used to repay installment debt rose from 6 percent in 1947 to about
14.3 percent in 1965. Shapiro, supra note 2, at 356. But "[tjhe [Federal] Reserve's
economists commented that 'although prepayments on installment debt have been ac-
counting for a growing share of disposable income, there is little evidence of significantly
increased difficulty in collections.'" N.Y. Times, July 11, 1965, § 3, at 1, col. 5.
Thus, although the first two Truth in Lending bills reported to committee tied the
need for a disclosure act to an excessive use of credit, the emphasis soon changed to mak-
ing consumer credit responsive to changes in general monetary policy. Compare 1961
Hearings on S. 1740, supra note 1, at 4; Hearings on S. 2755, supra note 3, at 3, with
1962 Hearings on S. 1740, supra note 4, at 4. For a discussion of how the responsive
use of credit is supposed to enhance economic stability, see notes 104-09 infra & accom-
panying text.
2 3 See B. CURRAN, TRENDS IN CONSUMER CREDIT LEGISLATION 2 (1965). In
1962 the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws suggested to
the American Bar Foundation that the latter undertake a study of consumer credit
The above work by Miss Barbara Curran was the result of that study and has become
the starting point for any work in the consumer credit field.
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- ranging from 4 to 30 percent, but usually in the 6 to 12 percent
range - which cannot be exceeded, even by an express waiver.24
The usury laws do not apply to the credit sales of goods, how-
ever, because of -the time-price doctrine. According to this doctrine,
approved by the United States Supreme Court,25 merchants who sell
goods on credit are not lenders. Because the cash paid over a period
of time is not worth as much to a merchant as the same amount paid
at the time of the purchase, he must increase the price of the goods
to make up for the loss. This credit charge merely represents the
difference between the time price and cash price; it is not interest,
which is a charge for the use of money. Thus, the usury limits
were inapplicable to credit sales.20
The usury laws were of little help to the wage earner. He was
seldom able to obtain loans from legitimate lending institutions
because the legal interest rates were too low to compensate lenders
for the risk and administrative costs involved. Thus, many wage
earners were driven to loan sharks with their exorbitant interest
rates.27
Although loan-sharking had long been a hard fact of consumer
life, the legislative response did not come until 1916. In that year
the Russell Sage Foundation drafted the Uniform Small Loan Act. 8
This Act was the model for the small loan legislation now in effect
in 49 of the 50 states. 29 It established a licensed small loan indus-
try, setting strict standards to be followed by all lenders covered by
the Act. The Act set an interest rate ceiling of 31 percent a month
on the unpaid balance, which amounts to 42 percent a year. This
provided a high rate of return for legitimate lenders, thus discour-
aging loan sharks, and at the same time satisfied the legislators labor-
ing under the "6 percent myth. °30  The scope of most state small
24 d. at 15.
25 Hogg v. Ruffner, 66 U.S. (1 Black) 115 (1861). See also Brooks v. Avery, 4 N.Y.
(4 Comstock) 225 (1850).
2 6 B. CURRAN, supra note 23, at 13.
27id. at 2.
28 Id. See Hearings on S. 2755, supra note 3, at 416. See generally L. BRANDT
& F. ANDREws, RUSSELL SAGE FOUNDATION 1907-1946 (1947). The seventh draft
of the Uniform Act is reprinted in B. CURAN, supra note 23, at 144-57.
2 9 See B. CURRAN, supra note 23, at 158-93 (charts 2-5); Hearings on S. 5, supra
note 2, at 415-22. Arkansas is the only state without a small loan act. See B. CURtAN,
supra note 23, at 158 (chart 2).
30 Hearings on S. 5, supra note 2, at 56; see B. CURRAN, supra note 23, at 6.
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loan legislation is limited, however, by its inapplicability to loans
over $5,000' and to credit sales transactions. 2
Although people have borrowed money since early times, the
American consumer rarely purchased goods on credit due to the
Puritan canon that one should be able to pay for what he buys.
The picture began to change in the 1930's, however, with the advent
of the automobile. Unless people were willing to save 3 or 4 years
to buy a car, they had to obtain financing. Buying on credit quicdy
gained respectability and is now common practice for most con-
sumers.33 Because it was not regulated by the state small loan stat-
utes, this popular use of credit exposed consumers to abuse by mer-
chants.
The legislative response was again slow, however, with only a
few states enacting retail installment sales acts before the 1950's.3
Today, 42 states and the District of Columbia have some kind of
retail installment sales act. "  Although most of these acts regulate
some of the substantive provisions of retail sales contracts,36 their
major emphasis has been disclosure rather than control.37  The ra-
tionale was that a purchase of goods, such as an automobile, is not
dictated by the same necessity that drives one to borrow money.
Thus, the only protection the consumer needed was sufficient infor-
mation to enable him to make a rational decision to postpone his
purchase if the credit terms were not agreeable.
In general, retail installment sales acts apply to installment con-
tracts for goods or services. Most of the acts require that the install-
ment contract be written, dated, and, if printed, printed in a type
size no smaller than a specified minimum; that various legends, in
large boldface type, be included in the contract; and that the con-
tract be labeled with a descriptive title, such as "Installment Sales
Contract." The consumer must receive notice of his rights and obli-
gations under the contract, including his right to a copy of the con-
31 B. CURRAN, supra note 23, at 21. Most states have a maximum somewhat less
than $5,000; the lowest is $200. Id.
32 Id. at 18; see text accompanying note 26 supra.
33 See note 2 supra.
34 See B. CURRAN, supra note 23, at 254-55 (chart 11).
35 Id. See generally Hogan, A Survey of State Retail Installment Sales Legislation,
44 CORNELL L.Q. 38 (1958).
In 1951, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) promulgated trade-practice rules for
the sale of automobiles, which contain disclosure requirements similar to many retail
installment sales acts. See 16 C.F.R. § 197 (1970).
3 6 See B. CURRAN, supra note 23, at 100-08.
37 Id. at 95.
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tract, his right to accelerate payment and receive a discount repre-
senting the finance charge that will not be earned, his right to redeem
repossessed property, and a notice that he has not paid for insurance,
if such is the case.38
Thus, as in Truth in Lending, the primary thrust of the typical
retail installment sales act is toward disclosure of the consumer's
rights and obligations, rather than regulation of the merchant.
The coverage of these acts, however, is not as broad as Truth in Lend-
ing. In only a few states do they apply to the sale of all goods and
services, and in some they apply only to the sale of automobiles."
Moreover, they do not apply to advertising.
The preceding discussion, although necessary for an understand-
ing of the protection afforded the consumer before Truth in Lend-
ing, is presented in the most general terms. It merely illustrates
that none of the principal kinds of legislation in this area - usury
statutes, small loan acts, and retail installment sales acts - gives
all-inclusive coverage to consumer credit transactions.!' Truth in
Lending is a welcome attempt to include all consumer credit transac-
tions within the coverage of one statute.4
81d. at 95-100.
39 See id. at 92-95.
4 0 The Uniform Consumer Credit Code [hereinafter cited as U3C] (all citations are
to the 1969 revised final draft) was drafted by the National Conference of Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws for the purpose of consolidating consumer credit law as
well as providing protection and legal remedies for the consumer. However, it has been
enacted by only two states, Oklahoma and Utah. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 14A §§ 1-101
to 9-103 (Supp. 1970); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 70B-1-101 to -9-103 (Supp. 1969).
The U3C, like Truth in Lending, applies to both consumer credit sales and con-
sumer loan transactions and requires full disclosure of credit terms. In addition, how-
ever, it sets rate ceilings, limits some traditional creditor remedies - repossession and
garnishment - and expands and creates some debtor safeguards - unconscionability,
defenses to enforcement of transactions which violate the Act, and a right to rescission
within 3 days of any home solicitation sale. The Act establishes an office of Adminis-
trator to enforce compliance with its provisions.
41 Regulation Z gives the following definition of consumer credit:
'Consumer credit? means credit offered or extended to a natural person, in which
the money, property, or service which is the subject of the transaction is pri-
marily for personal, family, household, or agricultural purposes and for which
either a finance charge is or may be imposed or which, pursuant to an agree-
ment, is or may be payable in more than 4 installments. 'Consumer loan' is
one type of 'consumer credit.' Fed. Res. Reg. Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(k) (1970).
Expressly exempted from Truth in Lending are extensions of credit to business or
government organizations, stockbroker transactions, non-real property credit extensions
in excess of $25,000 [accord, U3C § 2.104(1)(3)], and transactions under public utility
tariffs (utility bills). 15 U.S.C. § 1603 (Supp. IV, 1969). The U3C does not exempt
credit to businesses or stockbroker transactions, but does exempt pawnbroker transac-
tions. U3C § 1.202.
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IV. FEATURES OF THE NEW ACT
This section of the Note examines four parts of Truth in Lending
which the writer feels are of particular importance: (1) the require-
ment that the finance charge be stated in terms of an annual per-
centage rate of the unpaid balance, (2) the consumer's right of
rescission when he has given a security interest in his residence, (3)
the requirement of full disclosure when certain statements are made
in an advertisement, and (4) the enforcement machinery.
A. Annual Percentage Rate
Truth in Lending adopted annual percentage rate disclosure in-
stead of the dollars per hundred method, primarily for the following
reasons: interest rates, which constitute a large portion of the finance
charge, have traditionally been stated in percentages; financial insti-
tutions use an annual percentage rate when borrowing money from
the public (savings accounts); and it is easier to compare credit
costs according to a percentage rate than according to a dollar rate,
which is tailored to the particular transaction.4 2  Although the idea
of disclosure of finance charges43 in terms of an annual percentage
4 2 See Hearings on S. 5, supra note 2, at 92-93.
43 For purposes of disclosure of finance charges, Truth in Lending divides con-
sumer credit transactions into open end consumer credit plans (section 127, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1637 (Supp. IV, 1969) ), other than open end consumer credit sales transactions (sec-
tion 128, 15 U.S.C. § 1638 (Supp. IV, 1969) ), and other than open end consumer loan
transactions (section 129, 15 U.S.C. § 1639 (Supp. iv, 1969) ). A creditor must dis-
close the following items of an open end plan (see text accompanying notes 48-50
infra) before the account is opened:
(1) the conditions under which a finance charge will be imposed together with
the "free time" allowed,
(2) the method of determining the balance subject to a finance charge,
(3) the method of determining the finance charge,
(4) the nominal annual percentage rate computed by multiplying the periodic
rate by the number of periods in a year,
(5) if the creditor so elects,
(A) the effective annual percentage rate, or
(B) where (A) is not feasible or will be meaningless, a projected rate
based on future accounts,
(6) the conditions under which extraordinary charges will be imposed,
(7) the conditions under which a security interest will be retained, and a descrip-
tion of the interests which may be so retained.
With each billing where there is an outstanding balance or where a finance charge is
imposed, the following disclosures must be made to the extent applicable:
(1) the outstanding balance,
(2) the amount and date of the extension of credit, and an identification of the
goods if a purchase was involved,
(3) the amount credited to the account during the billing cycle,
(4) an itemized statement of the finance charges imposed,
(5) the periodic rate(s) the creditor uses to compute the finance charge and the
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rate of the unpaid balance was applauded by consumer, economist,
and politician alike, it was the biggest obstacle to the passage of the
Act.44
balances to which it is applicable, and, unless the annual percentage rate
is required to be disclosed under (6), the nominal annual percentage rate,
(6) if the monthly finance charge exceeds 50 cents, the quotient of the finance
charge for a period divided by the amount on which the finance charge was
based, multiplied by the number of periods in a year,
(7) the effective annual percentage rate if the creditor so elects,
(8) the portion of the balance on which a finance charge was imposed, and how
that balance was arrived at,
(9) the outstanding balance at the end of the period,
(10) the last date by which payment must be made to avoid additional finance
charges.
Not all of the above items will be applicable to each billing, however. For example,
if a consumer makes one purchase during the month and no payment, assuming a zero
balance and the forms of the creditor are well drawn, only four items ((1), (2), (9),
and (10) ) will have to be disclosed.
In an other than open end consumer credit sales transaction (one in which the
amount financed and the finance charge are fixed when the contract is consummated),
the creditor must disclose the following before extending credit:
(1) the cash price,
(2) the down payment,
(3) the balance remaining after subtracting the down payment from the cash
price,
(4) any credit charges not a part of the finance charge,
(5) the sum of (3) and (4),
(6) the finance charge,
(7) the finance charge, above a specified minimum, expressed as an annual per-
centage rate,
(8) the number, amount, and due date or periods of payments,
(9) late charges which may be incurred,
(10) a description of the security interest, if any, and the collateral thereof.
In an other than open end consumer loan transaction, the following disclosures
must be made before credit is extended:
(1) the full amount of credit over which the debtor will have actual use,
(2) incidental credit charges which are not finance charges,
(3) the sum of (1) and (2),
(4) the total finance charge, except in the case of a purchase money mortgage for
a house,
(5) the finance charge, above a specified minimum, expressed as an annual per-
centage rate.
The first disclosure is aimed at the lender practice of granting the debtor the amount
requested and then subtracting expenses from that amount so that the debtor receives
less than he bargained for.
4 4 Representative of the views of the opponents of annual percentage rate disclosure
is a statement made during the hearings by the vice president of the American Bankers
Association. He testified that a statement in terms of the simple annual interest rate
"is not necessary to enable the public to compare the cost of consumer credit. More-
over, we believe such a requirement is impractical, would be very difficult to administer,
would increase the expense of extending credit, and would confuse the public." Hear-
ings on S. 2755, supra note 3, at 695. See also R. JOHNSON, supra note 20, at 99-102.
But see Hearings on S. 2755, supra note 3, at 524,737.
But underlying many of the arguments marshallIl against the annual percentage
rate was the creditors' fear of the shock effect on consumers when the latter discovered
they were paying finance charges at rates often amounting to 18 percent or more.
Mortgage lenders, on the other hand, were concerned with the shock effect of dis-
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The main argument against annual percentage rate disclosure
was that the added clerical burden of printing new disclosure forms,
educating employees, and calculating percentage rates on indi-
vidual transactions was an unreasonable interference with business.45
This burden was exaggerated, however, because most credit trans-
actions are standardized,46 and the tables provided by the Federal
Reserve Board make determination of the annual rate a quick,
simple process which most clerks can learn in a short time."
A second argument was that it would be impossible to compute
the annual percentage rate when dealing with revolving charge
accounts. 48  In this kind of credit arrangement the amount of money
owed is considered due and payable on the monthly billing date,
but the buyer has the option of making a fractional payment on that
date and incurring a finance charge on the unpaid balance. Thus,
the buyer can pay his bill in full on the first due date, incurring
no finance charge,49 or pay it in two or more installments, the fi-
nance charge depending on the number of installments. Conse-
quently, the creditor is unable to make an accurate disclosure of the
annual percentage rate at the time of the purchase.50 Truth in
Lending's solution was to require creditors to disclose a nominal
annual percentage rate computed by multiplying their periodic rates
closure of the anount of the finance charge. Because the normal mortgage is payable
over a 20 to 30 year period, the finance charge often equals the sale price of the property.
Thus, mortgage lenders were able to include provisions in the Act stating that in a
credit sale or loan transaction involving the purchase of a dwelling the creditor is re-
quired to disclose the annual percentage rate, but not the finance charge. 15 U.S.C. §§
1637(a)(6), 1638(a)(4) (Supp. IV, 1969); see Fed. Res. Reg. Z, 12 C.F.R. §§
22 6 .8(c)(8)(i), 226.8(d)(3) (1970).
45 See 1961 Hearings on S. 1740, supra note 1, at 569-70; N.Y. Times, April 7,
1960, at 20, col. 1.
4 6 Spanogle, How Much Truth in What Kinds of Lending?, 16 J. PUB. L. 296, 310
(1967).
47 For a description of the tables, see Wall Street J., April 14, 1967, at 8, col. 2.
See also 1961 Hearings on S. 1740, sapra note 1, at 448-96; 1962 Hearings on S. 1740,
sapra note 4, at 51-52.
4 8 See generally R. JOHNSON, supra note 20, at 16; Wall Street J., Feb. 1, 1968, at
12, col. 4 (Midwest ed.).
In 1967 revolving credit accounted for only about 3 percent of consumer debt. Wall
Street J., June 9, 1967, at 3, col. 2 (Midwest ed.). But its use is rapidly expanding.
Cf. Jordan & Warren, supra note 14, at 446-47.
For a good example of the typical revolving credit transaction and an analysis of its
counterpart in the banking system (the check credit plan), see id. at 1306-07.
49 It is common practice for retailers to allow between 30 and 90 days of free time
before a finance charge is imposed. See Spanogle, supra note 46, at 315-16. See also
McAlister, Illusory Quest for 'Truth' in Lending, Wall Street J., May 2, 1968, at 16, col.
6.
5 0 See Jordan & Warren, supra note 14, at 1306-07.
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by the number of periods in a year. 1 This nominal rate will nor-
mally be higher than the rate paid by the average consumer because
it does not take into account the free time consumers are often
given before they are charged interest.5 2  Therefore, creditors are
given the option of also disclosing an effective annual percentage
rate. The effective rate is the average rate of interest paid by the
creditor's revolving credit customers over a representative period of
time. 3
Opponents of the Act argued further that requiring disclosure
of the annual percentage rate would cause merchants to bury the
finance charge in the retail price, enabling them to advertise a mis-
leading annual rate or no annual rate at all.54  Merchants catering
to high risk consumers have, in effect, been burying their finance
charges by raising the retail price of their goods to compensate for
the risk involved."' But Truth in Lending will only encourage more
burying if merchants consider it better business to advertise low
interest rates than low retail prices." And because the merchant
dealing with low income, high risk consumers usually has a captive
market,57 it should not make any difference to him whether the fi-
nance charge is reflected in the interest rate or the retail price.
Finally, opponents of the annual percentage rate provision argued
that consumers do not really care about this kind of information."8
The proponents, of course, countered with the argument that an
51 15 U.S.C. §§ 1637(a) (4), 1637(b) (5) (Supp. IV, 1969).
52 Jordan & Warren, supra note 14, at 1306-07; see note 49 supra.
53 15 U.S.C. §§ 1637(a)(5)(A), 1637(b)(7) (Supp. IV, 1969); see Fed. Res. Reg. Z,
12 C.F.R. § 226.11 (1970). If computation of the effective annual rate would be im-
practical or meaningless, the creditor may disclose, instead, a projected future rate of
return from his xevolving credit plan. 15 U.S.C. § 1637(a)(5)(B) (Supp. IV, 1969).
An executive from the J. C. Penney Co. testified that a survey conducted by that
company found that the average customer using the revolving credit plan incurred a
finance charge of slightly more than 10 percent. See Hearings on S. 5, supra note 2,
at 217-20; cf. id. at 505. Another sample, however, put the figure at 15.77 percent.
1962 Hearings on S. 1740, supra note 4, at 284-85.
5 4 See 1961 Hearings on S. 1740, supra note 1, at 127-30, 685; Hearings on S.
2755, supra note 3, at 471; Note, Consumer Legislation and the Poor, 76 YALE L.J.
745, 762 n.104 (1967).
55 See Jordan & Warren, supra note 14, at 1301.
Regulation Z specifically excludes finance charges from its definition of "cash price."
Fed. Res. Reg. Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(i) (1970).
56 See 1962 Hearings on S. 1740, supra note 4, at 136; 1961 Hearings on S. 1740,
supra note 1, at 502; Hearings on S. 2755, supra note 3, at 542.
5 7 See notes 115-17 infra & accompanying text.
58See, e.g., 1961 Hearings on S. 1740, supra note 1, at 254-55. See also Wall
Street J., July 23, 1969, at 18, col. 1 (Midwest ed.); Bloomfield, Credit Unions Divided
on Truth-in-Lending Act, The Plain Dealer (Cleveland, Ohio), Aug. 9, 1970, at 25-A,
col. 1.
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assessment of consumer interest can hardly be made until the con-
sumers have received the information. 9 This counterargument is
not as convincing as it first appears, however, and consumer apathy
about credit costs may be the strongest argument against the annual
percentage rate.60
B. Right of Rescission
A second innovation in Truth in Lending is a right of rescission
in any transaction in which a consumer has given a security interest
on his residence,6' other than a purchase money mortgage. 2 The
right extends until midnight of the third business day following
consummation of the transaction or delivery of the required disclo-
sures, whichever is later. 3 The consumer must notify the creditor
of his decision to rescind by either mail, telegram, or other writing. 4
Within 10 days of receipt of notice of rescission, the creditor must
return any consideration received and take steps to terminate the
security interest. If the consumer has received any property through
the transaction, the creditor has 10 days after the performance of
his obligations to reclaim the property, with title vesting in the con-
sumer if the creditor fails to reclaim the property.65
The right to rescission is not, however, as valuable a consumer
protection device as it first appears. First of all, the right may be
waived in emergency situations where the consumer cannot wait 3
days for the creditor's performance. 6 Although printed forms are
not permitted for this purpose,"' the waiver provision is still subject
59 See N.Y. Times, Jan. 7, 1960, at 27, col. 8.
60 See text accompanying notes 104-07, 110-13 infra.
61 15 U.S.C. § 1635 (Supp. IV, 1969); see Fed. Res. Reg. Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.9
(1970). Accord, U3C § 5.204.
The U3C also gives the consumer the right to rescind all home solicitation sales
within 3 days of the sale. Id. § 2.502.
62 15 U.S.C. § 1635(e) (Supp. IV, 1969); see Fed. Res. Reg. Z, 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.9
(g), 226.2(z). Accord, U3C § 5.204(5); see N.Y. Times, April 24, 1969, at 65, col. 2.
63 15 U.S.C. § 1635 (a) (Supp. IV, 1969).
A transaction is considered consummated at the time a contractual relationship is
created between the creditor and consumer, irrespective of the time set for performance.
Fed. Res. Reg. Z, 12 C.F.R. § 22 6 .2(cc) (1970). If the creditor sets the performance
date at least 3 days after consummation of the contract the consumer will have to exer-
cise his right before receiving what he purchased. Thus, his "cooling off" period will
lose some of its value. Interview with Wilbur Leatherberry, Attorney, Cleveland Legal
Aid Society, in Cleveland, Ohio, Sept. 23, 1969.
64 Fed. Res. Reg. Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.9(a) (1970).
65 15 U.S.C. § 1635(b) (Supp. IV, 1969).
661d § 1635(d); see Fed. Res. Reg. Z, 12 C.F.R. § 22 6 .9(e) (1970).
67 Fed. Res. Reg. Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.9(e)(3) (1970).
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to abuse because of the inherently unequal bargaining positions of
creditor and debtor. And, apart from the waiver provision, when-
ever a creditor challenges the exercise of the rescission right, the con-
sumer must be prepared to establish that he gave a security interest
in his residence, the date the transaction was consummated, and
whether and when he gave notice of rescission.
But the principal defect of the right of rescission is that it is not
broad enough. It is of no benefit to that segment of the population
who cannot afford to own their own homes, yet who need this pro-
tection the most. And it is available to the homeowning consumer
only in that rare situation in which he gives a security interest other
than a purchase money mortgage on his home. The right of rescis-
sion is designed to give the consumer a cooling off period to reflect
upon the bargain he has just made rather than to prevent fraud.
The rationale behind a cooling off period applies just as strongly to
credit transactions which are not secured by a consumer's residence.
In fact, a consumer is more likely to carefully deliberate before en-
tering into a transaction which involves mortgaging his home than
one which does not. Truth in Lending could have afforded more
consumers more protection by adopting a provision like the Uniform
Consumer Credit Code's right to rescission in all home solicitation
sales.6s
C. Advertising
Unlike any of the previous consumer credit legislation, Truth in
Lending applies to advertising. 69 The Act provides that no specific
installment or downpayment can be advertised unless the creditor
usually and customarily arranges installments or downpayments in
that amount.70 And when certain statements are made in an adver-
tisement, additional disclosures must be made in the same advertise-
ment. No specific term of an open end credit plan can be adver-
tised unless accompanied by substantially the same disclosures that
must be made to a consumer before he opens an account.7 1  An
advertisement of an other than open end plan that states the down-
payment, the amount of an installment, the finance charge, the num-
68U3C § 2.502.
69 15 U.S.C. §§ 1661-64 (Supp. IV, 1969); see Fed. Res. Reg. Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.10
(1970).
70 15 U.S.C. § 1662 (Supp. IV, 1969).
711d. § 1663; see Fed. Res. Reg. Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.10(c) (1970). For the dis-
closures that must be made to a consumer before he opens an open end credit account,
see note 43 supra.
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ber of installments, or the period of repayment, must also disclose
the cash price, the downpayment, the schedule of payments, the
annual percentage rate, and the deferred payment price or the sum
of the payments.72  Thus, for example, a furniture store which ad-
vertises a bedroom set in its store window for "only $50.00 down"
must also disclose that the entire set costs $550, that the balance is
repayable over 24 months in installments of $26.92 per month due
on the first of each month, that the annual percentage rate is 16
percent, and that the deferred payment price is $646.25.
D. Enforcement
1. Administrative Enforcement.- It was the proponents' orig-
inal intention that the Federal Reserve Board would be the exclusive
administrator of Truth in Lending.72 The Board had previously en-
forced Regulation W, an emergency credit control measure promul-
gated during World War II."- In addition, the bill's sponsor, Senator
Douglas, was a member of the Banking and Currency Committee,
which has jurisdiction over the Federal Reserve System. But Wil-
liam McChesney Martin, then Chairman of the Federal Reserve
Board, repeatedly argued that Truth in Lending was not within the
scope of general monetary policy which the Federal Reserve System
ordinarily administers.75  After assurances from other agencies,
especially the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), that they would
be able to undertake or supplement enforcement of the Act,76 admin-
istrative enforcement was divided among nine agencies of the Federal
Government.7 The Federal Reserve Board was authorized to pre-
scribe regulations for the entire Act.78 The Board and seven other
72 15 U.S.C. § 1664 (Supp. IV, 1969); see Fed. Res. Reg. Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.10(d)
(1970).
"A good 'rule of thumb' to apply to all credit advertising ... is that a retailer may
not state any specific credit term (cash price is not a credit term) unless he makes full dis-
closure of his credit plan." N.Y. Times, April 30, 1969, at 59, col. 3.
Truth in Lending's advertising provisions, however, will probably not apply to such
statements as "charge accounts available" or "just say charge it." "General statements
that credit is available or that a particular item may be charged to a revolving or flexible
account will not cause the provisions of the advertising sections of the Truth in Lending
Act to come into play." Kinter, Henneberger & Neill, A Primer on Truth in Lending,
13 ST. Louis U.L.J. 501, 511 (1969).
73 See 1962 Hearings on S. 1740, supra note 4, at 108; N.Y. Times, April 4, 1960,
at 45, col. 3.
74 Fed. Res. Reg. W, 12 C.F.R. §§ 222.1-.11 (Supp. 1941).
7 5 See, e.g., 1961 Hearings on S. 1740, supra note 1, at 276.
76 See, e.g., 1962 Hearings on S. 1740, supra note 4, at 130.
77 15 U.S.C. § 1607 (Supp. IV, 1969).
78 Id. § 1604.
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agencies79 were authorized to regulate creditors - for example,
banks, credit unions, and common carriers - falling within their
respective jurisdictions. The FTC was given residual jurisdiction, °
which will make it the primary enforcer of the Act because most
violations will occur in the credit sales area."'
The FTC has only limited enforcement powers.8 2  A violation
of a final cease and desist order can result in a $5,000 fine per viola-
tion per day,' but such an order is issued only after months of fact-
finding sessions and does not become final until the respondent has
exhausted his judicial remedies.84 In the meantime -the creditor can
continue to violate the Act, subject, of course, to possible civil and
criminal penalties.85 Truth in Lending, however, broadens the area
in which the FTC can employ the enforcement powers it does possess.
In 1941 the Supreme Court held in FTC v. Bunte Bros., 6 that the
FTC has jurisdiction only over activities in commerce, not those
merely affecting commerce. Truth in Lending nullifies that decision
with respect to its provisions, providing that the FTC can enforce
compliance by any person with the requirements "under this sub-
chapter, irrespective of whether that person is engaged in com-
merce . "87
79 The Comptroller of the Currency; the Board of Directors of the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation; the Federal Home Loan Bank Board; the Director of the Bureau
of Federal Credit Unions; the Interstate Commerce Commission; the Civil Aeronautics
Board; the Secretary of Agriculture.
80 15 U.S.C. § 1607(c) (Supp. IV, 1969).
81 The FTC was the most likely candidate to bear the brunt of enforcement of Truth
in Lending because of its previous experience in preventing deceptive trade practices
under section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA), 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1964).
See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. FTC, 120 F.2d 175 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 668
(1941) (FTC prohibited use of the term "6 percent" in a finance plan which resulted
in payments in excess of that figure). See also 1961 Hearings on S. 1740, supra note 1,
at 20-31; 1962 Hearings on S. 1740, supra note 4, at 155-57.
82 A violation of Truth in Lending is considered a violation of the FTCA for pur-
poses of the FTC's enforcement powers. 15 U.S.C. § 1607(c) (Supp. IV, 1969).
83 FTCA § 5(1), 15 U.S.C. § 45(1) (1964).
84 Id. § 45 (g). As of this writing there have been no final cease and desist orders
under Truth in ending. The FTC has, however, made an initial decision and issued a
cease and desist order against Zale Corporation, a jewelery store chain. Zale Corp.,
3 CCH CONSUMER CREDiT GUim 5 99,688 (FTC Aug. 10, 1970).
85 See text accompanying notes 88-97 infra.
A former Chairman of the FTC, Caspar Weinberger, has recently expressed his hope
that the FTC will soon be given the power to issue preliminary injunctions pending
hearings on unfair trade practices. Weinberger, The Federal Trade Commission: Prog-
ress and a New Profile, 22 CAsE W. RE& L. REv. 5, 9 (1970), (supra in this issue).
86 312 U.S. 349 (1941).
87 15 U.S.C. § 1607(c) (Supp. IV, 1969).
Truth in Lending preempts state laws only to the extent of an inconsistency. Id.
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2. Criminal and Civil Enforcement.- Anyone who willfully
or knowingly gives inaccurate information under Truth in Lending
or fails to comply with any of its provisions is subject to a $5,000
fine or a year in prison or both.8" It was in private enforcement of
the Act, however, that the drafters foresaw the most effective imple-
mentation of its provisions."9 Under the Act, a creditor who fails
to make a required disclosure is subject to liability for twice the
finance charge up to $1,000, but no less than $100, plus reasonable
attorneys' fees.9 ° Actions may be brought by an aggrieved consumer
in a federal district court regardless of the amount in controversy.9 1
The statute of limitations is 1 year from the date of the occurrence
of the violation.2
The liberal recovery allowance is designed to encourage con-
sumers to bring actions, and to encourage attorneys to prosecute
these actions in situations where they would not be adequately com-
pensated by a contingent fee arrangement. If this second purpose
is to be achieved, the courts will have to determine fees on some
other basis than a percentage of the judgment. In the first action
brought under Truth in Lending, the plaintiff's attorneys suggested
three ways of determining attorneys' fees: (1) a minimum fee
schedule, (2) normal billing practices of plaintiffs' attorneys in com-
mercial cases, and (3) a reasonable hourly rate.9" Early court deter-
minations of a $30 or $40 an hour rate would be a great boost to
the Act, although they would increase the danger of a new kind of
"ambulance chasing."94
The Act specifically provides creditors with defenses. A creditor
cannot be held civilly liable if he shows by a preponderance of the
§ 1610(a); see Fed. Res. Reg. Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.6(b) (1970). And if the laws of a
state subject any class of credit transactions to requirements substantially similar to the
disclosure, rescission, or civil liability provisions of Truth in Lending, the state can
obtain an exemption from the Act for that class of transactions. 15 U.S.C. § 1633
(Supp. IV, 1969); see Fed. Res. Reg. Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.12 (1970). As of this writing
four states - Maine, Massachusetts, Oklahoma, and Connecticut - have obtained
partial exemptions from the Act. 1 CCH CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE 5 3682, at 3381-
82 (1970).
88 15 U.S.C. § 1611 (Supp. IV, 1969).
89 See 1961 Hearings on S. 1740, supra note 1, at 66.
90 15 U.S.C. § 1640 (a) (Supp. IV, 1964).
91 Id. § 1640 (e).
92 ld.
93 Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, at
8, White v. Belogonis, Civil No. 69-2858 (S.D.N.Y. filed July 1, 1969).
94 See 1961 Hearings on S. 1740, supra note 1, at 610. See also Elsman, Federal
Truth in Lending Act: Due Date for Creditors - July 1, 48 MICH. ST. B.J. 12, 16
(May 1969).
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evidence that the violation was unintentional and that the error oc-
curred in spite of procedures reasonably adopted to avoid it. " This
provision protects creditors from liability for the negligence of their
employees, and may result in some creditors merely setting up for-
mal disclosure procedures. Creditors can also escape liability if they
correct an error within 15 days after discovering it and before an
action is instituted or they receive written notice of the error. 6 But
when correcting an error, a creditor cannot impose a finance charge in
excess of the percentage rate originally disclosed." Thus, in situa-
tions where a creditor has disclosed too low a rate or no rate at all,
and the error is corrected in time, the consumer's finance charge
will remain at the originally disclosed rate.
V. SHORTCOMINGS OF A DIsCLOSURE ACT
A. Does Truth in Lending Disclose?
Truth in Lending requires that credit information be disclosed
clearly and conspicuously 8 The regulations add that the disclo-
sures must be in meaningful sequence and that the terms "finance
charge" and "annual percentage rate" must be printed more con-
spicuously than the rest of the information."" Thus, if consumers
read their contracts, they should be aware of both the total amount
of finance charges they are paying, and the annual percentage rate
these charges represent.
It is one of the facts of consumer life, however, that most con-
sumers do not read their contracts. This is partly attributable to
the consumer's having made the decision to buy by the time he reaches
the contract stage, giving him cause to read his contract only if he
distrusts the salesman.10 A second reason is that the unintelligibil-
ity of most installment sales contracts discourages the consumer
from trying to decipher one a second time.1'0 Truth in Lending ap-
95 15 U.S.C. § 16 4 0 (c) (Supp. IV, 1969).
N0ld. § 1640(b).
971d,
08Id. § 1631(a); see Fed. Res. Reg. Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.6 (1970).
99 Fed. Res. Reg. Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.6(a) (1970).
100 Jordan & Warren, supra note 14, at 1320. -The consumer is sold before he ever
signs the contract and he seldom reads it before or after he signs." Id.
101 William McChesney Martin, former Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board,
former Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, and former president of the New York Stock
Exchange, admitted that he was confused by automobile installment contracts. Hear-
ings on S. 2755, supra note 3, at 204-05; N.Y. Times, April 6, 1960, at 28, col. 3. See
also Hearings on S. 2755, supra note 3, at 600.
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patently cures this confusion as far as credit terms are concerned,0"2
but until consumers are made aware of the Act's requirements, their
past experience with contracts may discourage them from even look-
ing for the credit disclosures. Thus, whatever the merits of disclo-
sure, consumers will have to be educated, at least to the point where
they will read their contracts, before Truth in Lending can accom-
plish its purposes.
B. Disclosure and the Purposes of Truth in Lending
Truth in Lending's two main purposes are to enhance economic
stability and to enable consumers to avoid the uninformed use of
credit.' This section of the Note will examine how the Act is sup-
posed to bring about these results and whether it will be successful.
1. Economic Stability.- The premise behind the finding that
economic stability will be enhanced is that disclosure of credit costs
will make consumers more responsive to fluctuations in general
monetary policy. Consumers will supposedly regulate their credit
spending according to the rise and fall of interest rates, thus contrib-
uting to the stabilization of the economy.' 04 For example, when
interest rates go up in an inflationary period, knowledge of the in-
crease will result in a reduction in consumer credit spending, revers-
ing the inflationary trend. And in periods of recession, knowledge
of the decline in interest rates will result in an increase in credit
spending, with its consequent rehabilitative effect on the economy.
There are two flaws in the above argument, however, which in-
validate the finding that Truth in Lending will enhance economic
stability. First, the premise that disclosure of credit costs will make
102 See text accompanying notes 98-99 supra.
103 See 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (Supp. IV, 1969).
104 See, e.g., 1961 Hearings on S. 1740, supra note 1, at 560.
[T] he cost of credit is a natural countercyclical influence on the timing of credit
purchases and repayments....
However, the stabilizing effect of changes in credit costs depends on
awareness by consumers that the changes have occurred. If buyers are ignor-
ant of the true costs of credit, they are less subject to influence by cost changes.
By increasing consumer awareness, this bill will help to make the cyclical
fluctuation of credit costs a more stabilizing influence on the economy. Id.
at 45-46 (statement of James Tobin, Council of Economic Advisers).
For a similar statement by Senator Douglas, see Hearings on S. 750 Before The Sub-
comm. on Production and Stabilization of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency,
88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 7-8 (1963). See N.Y. Times, July 18, 1961, at 10, col. 6.
See also REPORT OF THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS,
reprinted in 1961 Hearings on S. 1740, supra note 1, at 15-16; Wall Street J., July
5, 1961, at 3, col. 2. But see 1961 Hearings on S. 1740, supra note 1, at 252 (statement
of Professor Robert Johnson); Hearings on S. 2755, supra note 3, at 808.
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consumers more responsive to fluctuations in monetary policy is an
invalid one for several reasons. The cost of credit is usually a minor
consideration to the consumer, the primary consideration being the
product. Once the consumer is sold on the product, it is unlikely
that disclosure of the annual percentage rate will result in his chang-
ing his mind. Even more influential in the consumer's decision to
buy is the size of the monthly payment. 0 5 For a person with a fixed
amount of money to spend each month, the difference between a
monthly payment of $12 and one of $18 assumes much more impor-
tance than the difference between an interest rate of 12 percent and
one of 18 percent.
Two additional observations concerning consumer credit buttress
the argument that it is unresponsive to interest rates. One is that
fluctuations in consumer credit spending are often a result of ex-
pectations of future income.10 6 The second is that the growth of
installment debt has been horizontal - an increase in the number of
debtors - rather -than vertical - an increase in the volume of
debt among prior debtors. 0 7 It is doubtful that a change of a few
percentage points in the interest rates will control a family's decision
whether or not to begin using credit.
But even if consumer credit were responsive to fluctuations in
interest rates, the argument that Truth in Lending will enhance eco-
nomic stability is a faulty one. The cost of money represents only
a minor portion of the expenses of lending institutions. 08 Thus,
when the interest rates paid by these institutions change, the rates
charged the consumer will not reflect the entire amount of the
change. In addition, because most lending institutions obtain a large
part of their funds by long-term borrowing, a change in interest
rates will not effect them immediately, and thus even that portion
of the rate change that does reach the consumer will be delayed. 09
105 See, e.g., 1962 Hearings on S. 1740, supra note 4, at 84; 1961 Hearings on S.
1740, supra note 1, at 261, 569; Hearings op S. 2755, supra note 3, at 133, 773, 807;
Kripke, Consumer Credit Regulation: A Creditor-Oriented Viewpoint, 68 CoLUw. L
REv. 445, 469 (1968).
106 Shapiro, Installment Credit, in INTERNATEONAL ENCYcLoPEDIA OF THE SO-
CIAL SciENcEs 354, 356 (1968).
107 Id. at 357.
108 1961 Hearings on S. 1740, supra note 1, at 252 (statement of Professor Robert
Johnson).
109 Id. Professor Johnson gave the following illustration:
Let us assume that a consumer is considering the time purchase of a $100
radio, but is waiting until finance rates decline. Let us say that at the peak of
the boom, when short-term money costs 6 percent, his finance charge would be
$8 on a 12-month contract, or an effective annual rate of about 14.8 percent.
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The result is that even large changes in interest rates become negligi-
ble by the time they reach the consumer, and will hardly influence
even the responsive consumer to change his buying habits.
2. Consumer Protection.- The principal purpose of Truth in
Lending is to enable consumers to easily compare credit costs and
thus intelligently shop for credit." °  There is little dispute that
disclosure of finance charges as an annual percentage rate of the
unpaid balance will make it easy to compare credit costs. Even the
most unsophisticated consumer knows, for example, that 15 percent
is less than 18 percent. But the question remains whether disclosure
is an effective consumer protection device.
Annual percentage rate disclosure will dispel the "6 percent
myth." Upon discovering the interest rates they are being charged,
some consumers may reduce their volume of credit spending or re-
frain from using credit altogether."- A reduction in their volume
of credit spending, however, would result in a lower standard of
living for most consumers. And those consumers who could pay
cash and still maintain their standard of living will more than likely
decide that if the convenience of credit shopping was worth paying
12 percent when they thought they were paying 6 percent, the con-
venience is worth paying 12 percent when they know they are paying
12 percent.
Thus, annual percentage rate disclosure will only be meaningful
to those consumers who are both willing and able to shop for credit.
It is submitted, however, that few among those able to shop for
credit - those who have both the necessary mobility and the bold-
ness to ask about credit terms - will begin to do so after Truth in
In the recession that follows, money rates are cut in half; they fall to 3 per-
cent. Sales finance companies are now able to obtain short-term loans at half
their earlier cost, and they pass the full reduction along to consumers. If
we assume the sources and costs of funds described earlier, it can be shown
that the total finance charge to the consumer will decline to $7.33 from $8,
and the annual rate will decline to 13.5 percent from 14.8 percent... Thus,
even a dramatic change in money rates will produce a relatively minor change
in consumer finance rates and a negligible change in the time price of a prod-
uct. Id.
110 See 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (Supp. IV, 1969). See also Hearings on S. 2755, supra
note 3, at 585.
M' Opponents of Truth in Lending predicted that the shock effect of increased
knowledge of credit costs would have a massive depressant effect on the economy. See
1961 Hearings ons S. 1740, supra note 1, at 259-60; cf. Hearings on S. 2755, supra
note 3, at 738, 809. But see Burman, Bay State Assays Tnuth-in-Lending Law, Christian
Science Monitor, April 17, 1967, at 13, col. 2 (a survey of the 3 -month-old Massachu-
setts truth in lending law which the author found to have no discernible impact on con-
sumer behavior or loan volume).
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Lending." 2  Consumers are more interested in the primary prod-
uct and the monthly payments than in the finance charge.118 Added
to these considerations are factors such as the convenience and good-
will of a certain store or shopping center, which a few percentage
points of credit savings are not likely to overcome.
The chief criticism of Truth in Lending is that it will only help
those who need help the least - the sophisticated consumers who
have both the ability and motivation to shop for credit."14 The
low income consumer is no better off than before, except that if he
reads his contract, he now knows how large a finance charge he is
paying. The low income consumer is by definition a poor credit
risk." 5  Consequently he is driven to the "neighborhood stores,"
which are not only willing to extend him credit, but actually en-
courage him to use credit.:"6 And because of their captive market,
these stores are able to sell low quality goods at high prices." 7  The
low income consumer has little real choice. He is trained by society
to want the symbols and appurtenances of the good life, but lacks
the means to obtain them. 18 He must purchase on whatever terms
the neighborhood store offers or do without.
Thus, increased information about credit costs is of little value
to the low income consumer. Often a member of a minority racial
112 A study commissioned by the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston on the former
Massachusetts truth in lending law, which required annual percentage rate disclosure
[Act of August 31, 1966, ch. 587, § 1, Mass. Laws 539, as amended MAss. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 140C, §§ 6(a) (4), 6(b) (6), 7(b) (2) (Supp. 1970)], found that consum-
ers "are apparently either unaware of the requirement for disclosure or indifferent to
it.. .. The annual rate disclosure has not stimulated active consumer shopping for
credit and has had no appreciable effect on competition." Wall Street J., July 11, 1969,
at 22, col. 1.
113 See text accompanying note 105 supra.
114 "The existing scheme of consumer-credit laws - although well intended and
carefully devised - is vulnerable to the criticism that it supplies largely middle-class
solutions (e.g., rate ceilings, disclosure) to what has increasingly become a lower-class
problem." Jordan & Warren, supra note 14, at 449.
115 D. CAPLOViTZ, THE PooR PAY MORE 14 (1963).
1 1 6See id. at 15-20, 87-90. For a frank description of how a ghetto merchant oper-
ates, given by a ghetto merchant himself, see Drosin, Spanish Harlem Furniture Seller
Provides Credit, Plus High Prices and Hard Dunning, Wall Street J., Aug. 28, 1970,
at 22, col. I (Midwest ed.).
117 In large part, these merchants have a "captive" market because their cus-
tomers do not meet the economic requirements of consumers in the larger,
bureaucratic marketplace. But also, they can sell inferior goods at high prices
because, in their own words, the customers are not "price and quality con-
scious." Interviews found that the merchants perceive their customers as un-
sophisticated shoppers. [One) merchant... said, "People do not shop in this
area. Each person who comes into the store wants to buy something and is a
potential customer. It is just up to who catches him." D. CAPLOVITZ, supra
note 115, at 19.
118 Id. at 14.
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or ethnic group," 9 he is uncomfortable shopping away from his
own neighborhood where the creditors speak his language. And
even if he were able to obtain credit on more reasonable terms
outside his neighborhood, he often lacks the sophistication and bold-
ness to effectively shop for credit. 20 Disclosure is a necessary part of
any consumer protection plan,121 but to solve the credit problems of
those members of our society who need protection the most - the
low income consumers - something more is needed. 121
119 See id. Caplovitz has demonstrated that there is a relationship between minority
races and higher costs. Id. at 90-93.
120 Id. at 14-15. See Note, Consumer Legislation and the Poor, 76 YALE L.J. 745
(1967).
Low income consumers normally lack all of the model characteristics:
(1) Belief in Comparative Shopping: Low income consumers are often not
aware that they could get more for their money by visiting a number
of stores, particularly those outside their immediate neighborhood ...
(A) Low income consumers usually shop primarily [on] credit... (B)
Low income consumers are frequently concerned to satisfy non-material
needs by their purchases: status-seeking and escapism heavily influence
their buying patterns.... (C) Many of the poor are shy and unwilling
to deal with strangers, preferring instead to trade with local people whom
they already know, and who are more likely to be personable and speak
their language....
(2) Ability to Pick Out the Best Buy: Low income consumers generally
lack the technical knowledge needed to choose among consumer durables
such as appliances or cars; they are usually less educated, less likely to
read publications such as Consumer Reports, and generally less able to
make rational choices among products than their middle income counter-
parts....
(3) Freedom to Engage in Comparative Shopping: . . . They feel, usually
correctly, that they cannot get the credit they need outside of their own
neighborhood. . . . This pressure to shop within the local business
community is compounded by shyness, the need to care for children, and
the inconvenience of a time-consuming trip to a more affluent area....
(4) Knowledge of Legal Rights and Liabilities: Most laymen lack more than
a superficial knowledge of their rights and liabilities in a post-sale legal
conflict....
(5) Motivation: ... Many of the poor who do have a conscious desire to get
more goods and services for their money have failed so often in attempt-
ing to do so that they no longer regard the attempt as worthwhile....
In sum, the new wave of informational legislation will be of little help to
the poor because it presupposes values, motivation and knowledge which
do not generally exist among them. Id. at 749-54.
121 "[Truth in Lending] does not seek to regulate creditors, and only regulation
can solve some problems. However, Truth in Lending legislation should not be aban-
doned for failing to provide regulation. The legislation can be effective within its
limits, but its beneficial aspects should not be overrated." Spanogle, How Much Truth
in What Kinds of Lending?, 16 J. PUB. L. 296,299 (1967).
122 The Committee on Uniform State Laws has concluded:
[C)onsumer protection in the area of consumer credit can be realized only
if the many facets of the problems involved are considered. Disclosure is
but one of the problem areas. Equally, if not more important for consumer
protection are rate ceilings, contract limitations and other requirements, restric-
tions on insurances and insurance coverages, advertising restraints, limitations
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The real problem of the low income consumer will require a
solution utilizing political, economic, and educational forces. But
until such a solution is forthcoming, the consumer should be pro-
tected from merchants who are continually pressuring him to over-
extend his credit and purchase inferior merchandise. Of course, the
most effective solution to the credit problems of the low income
consumer would be a refusal by merchants to sell on credit to con-
sumers who are obviously overextending themselves.2 It is unreal-
istic to rely on such a solution, however, while a significant number
of merchants continue to direct their sales efforts primarily tovard
high risk consumers. 2 4 The foothold of some of these neighbor-
hood merchants might be weakened in part if the more "respectable"
retailers would open their doors to the better risks among low in-
come consumers who do not appear to be overextending their credit.
This greater availability of reasonable credit for reasonable consumer
needs might prevent at least a few low income buyers from dealing
with the neighborhood merchant and becoming victims of his pres-
sure tactics.
The most effective means of protecting the low income con-
sumer appears to lie in the statutory regulation of credit. Although
credit regulation is objectionable to lenders and installment retailers,
it offers the only reliable protection against the exploitation of low
income consumers. To be effective, credit regulation would have to
consist of basic restrictions, including a minimum down payment
(computed as a percentage of the total purchase price) and a maxi-
mum length of maturity for all credit sales. 25 In addition, an an-
nual percentage rate ceiling should be imposed on all credit trans-
actions, prohibiting at least legal gouging on interest rates. The
on creditors' remedies, provisions for debtors' rights and remedies, and ade-
quate facilities for administration and enforcement of the established rules.
Hearings on S. 5 Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions of the Senate
Comm. on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 283 (1967).
123 Cf. 115 CONG. REC. 13,471 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1969) (President Nixon's ad-
dress to Congress on consumer problems).
The canons of ethics of the American Bankers Association require self restraint in
extending credit to bad risks. The canons are cited in 1961 Hearings on S. 1740,
supra note 1, at 527-28.
The practice by some merchants of contacting recent bankrupts and offering them
credit, with the knowledge that they cannot be discharged again for 6 years, could
be curtailed if the local legal newspapers would refrain from publishing lists of recently
discharged bankrupts.
124 See D. CAPLOVITZ, supra note 115, at 15-20; Drosin, supra note 116. See alsA
note 117 supra.
125See D. CAPLOVITZ, supra note 115, at 190-91; N.Y. Times, Aug. 28, 1960, § 6
(Magazine), at 38.
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level of this ceiling, as well as the minimum down payment and the
maximum repayment period, would have to be determined from a
careful study of long range financial data. Ultimately, the extent
of the credit restrictions would have to be balanced against the fact
that too great a restriction on credit terms will prevent even "re-
spectable" retailers and lenders from realizing a fair profit in dealing
with high risk consumers.
The enactment of consumer credit regulations appears to be the
only effective solution to the current problems of the low income
consumer. Disclosure is of little help to him because he is not able
to effectively utilize the information he receives. Restrictions on
creditors' remedies provide some relief, but it comes "after the
fact.' 126  Until the economic and social problems of low income
consumers are solved, government regulation of credit extention is
necessary. The government may not be ready to take affirmative
steps to eliminate poverty in our country, but it can at least help
the poor make the most efficient use of what resources they have by
protecting them from exploitation.
VI. CONCLUSION
Truth in Lending has strengthened the consumer's position in
the battle of forms. If the consumer reads his contracts, if he at-
taches as much importance to the finance charge as he does to the
monthly payment, if he is not shy in his dealings with salesmen, and
if he is willing and able to do comparison shopping, he is somewhat
better off now than before the Act. Consumer education about their
rights under the Act and about credit in general is the most im-
portant factor in making disclosure an effective method of consumer
protection. But disclosure is far from the final answer. In a society
where credit buying is a way of life, stronger measures must be taken
to protect the consumer, sometimes from overreaching merchants,
sometimes from himself.
JOHN M. DRAIN, JR.*
126 For example, section 5.103 of the U3C provides that where the cash price of an
article is $1,000 or less and the purchaser defaults, the creditor is restricted to either
repossession or an action for the unpaid balance; he cannot both repossess and obtain
a deficiency judgment. See also note 40 s pra. The Consumer Credit Protection Act
[Pub. L. No. 90-321, tits. I-V, 82 Stat. 144 (1968) (codified in scattered sections of 15,
18 U.S.C.] itself regulates extortionate credit transactions (Title II) and limits the gar-
nishment remedy (Title III).
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